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<title>Publius: The Journal of Federalism - current issue</title>
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<prism:coverDisplayDate>Fall 2009</prism:coverDisplayDate>
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<title><![CDATA[Government Quality and Vertical Power-Sharing in Fractionalized States]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/585?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Recent empirical studies have demonstrated that ethno-linguistic diversity has a negative relationship with quality of government (QoG). In response to this challenge, states have two broad options with respect to vertical power-sharing. One, they can attempt to integrate various factions by adopting a unitary, centralized constitution. Two, they can accommodate minority groups with ethno-federalism, giving them a degree of regional autonomy. Using numerous QoG indicators in a cross-sectional regression from 1995 to 2004, the data show that ethno-federalism outperforms its integrationist rival for each QoG measure employed in the analysis. While numerous other empirical studies have examined the impact of ethno-federal institutions on either civil conflict or separatism, this is the first to assess the effects of this institution on government quality relative to integrationist states.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Charron, N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 15 Sep 2009 07:08:24 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp015</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Government Quality and Vertical Power-Sharing in Fractionalized States]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>39</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>605</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>585</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/606?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Competitive Federalism and the Governance of Controversial Science]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/606?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Tensions between the United States government and state governments increased during the Bush Administration, 2001&ndash;2008. Blame was typically placed on the Administration's conservative policy preferences. This article analyzes how the issue of stem cell research was managed during those years in Washington, DC and how the states responded. The case highlights contradictions in the Bush Administration's brand of conservatism, how this promoted interstate competition, and why state governments had to wrestle with major policy dilemmas. Concerns surrounding moral principles, scientific progress, and economic competitiveness produced a patchwork of state funding and regulatory regimes. That outcome has not been ideal from several perspectives. Advances in biotechnology and other controversial areas of science will force future national and state governments to confront similar policymaking challenges.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mintrom, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 15 Sep 2009 07:08:24 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjn033</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Competitive Federalism and the Governance of Controversial Science]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>39</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>631</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>606</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/632?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[When is Fiscal Decentralization Good for Governance?]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/632?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Many developing countries are seeking to improve governance with fiscal decentralization. It is therefore worth revisiting what we know about political and economic institutions to understand how and under what circumstances decentralization can be beneficial. In an effort to do that, I review past research on the governance implications of devolving power to subnational authorities. Based on this review, I find that the gains from decentralization depend sensitively on how subnational authorities and intergovernmental relations are structured. I therefore conclude the paper by drawing nine lessons from theory and experience to help improve the design of decentralized institutions.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hankla, C. R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 15 Sep 2009 07:08:24 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjn034</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[When is Fiscal Decentralization Good for Governance?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>39</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>650</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>632</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[What Makes Strong Federalism Seem Weak? Fiscal Resources and Presidential-Provincial Relations in Argentina]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/651?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article revives an unresolved political debate now masquerading as an empirical puzzle: how can we characterize the nature of Argentine federalism when recent presidential administrations support conflicting conclusions about it? Carlos Sa&uacute;l Menem (1989&ndash;1999) easily pushed through policy changes with the support of governors and provincial delegates in congress, implying that federalism is weak. Fernando De la R&uacute;a (1999&ndash;2001) faced considerable provincial and congressional opposition, implying that federalism is strong. To resolve this puzzle, I recast federalism in terms of its economic context. I argue that economic growth renders presidential&ndash;provincial relations positive-sum, leading to intergovernmental cooperation and the appearance of weak federalism. Economic decline turns presidential&ndash;provincial relations zero-sum, raising intergovernmental conflict, and the appearance of strong federal institutions.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Benton, A. L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 15 Sep 2009 07:08:24 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjn032</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[What Makes Strong Federalism Seem Weak? Fiscal Resources and Presidential-Provincial Relations in Argentina]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>39</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>676</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>651</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Continuity and Change: A Ranking of Key Issues Affecting U.S. Intergovernmental Relations (1995-2005)]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/677?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Few would dispute that federalism and intergovernmental relations in the United States are dynamic and ever-changing. The actions of the U.S. Congress and executive branch, U.S. Supreme Court cases, state innovations, and political, economic, and international events have direct effects on the relationships between and among governments&mdash;often advantaging one governmental level with more power, more discretion, or more responsibilities. It is important for scholars to recognize these actions and trends as they develop and test federalism and intergovernmental relations theories in the United States and as they compare these with federalism events and trends in other federal countries.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Weissert, C. S., Stenberg, C. W., Cole, R. L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 15 Sep 2009 07:08:24 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp007</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Continuity and Change: A Ranking of Key Issues Affecting U.S. Intergovernmental Relations (1995-2005)]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>39</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>695</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>677</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/696?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Functional Federalism in Political Campaign Debates]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/696?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Which factors influence the topics addressed by candidates in political debates? This study investigates the question of how the level of elective office influences the content of political debates by employing computer content analysis to investigate the issue emphasis of political campaign debates. Paul Peterson's (1995, <I>The price of federalism</I>. Washington, DC: CQ Press) theory of functional federalism recognizes that political offices at different levels of government have discrete purviews, so that senators are more likely to emphasize national issues than governors. This study confirms the prediction of functional federalism in non-presidential debates and then extends it by demonstrating that presidential campaign messages emphasize federal issues even more than Senate (or gubernatorial) discourse.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Henson, J. R., Benoit, W. L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 15 Sep 2009 07:08:24 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp018</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Functional Federalism in Political Campaign Debates]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>39</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>706</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>696</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/707?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[In Memoriam: Samuel H. Beer Deil S. Wright]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/707?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Weissert, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 15 Sep 2009 07:08:24 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp020</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[In Memoriam: Samuel H. Beer Deil S. Wright]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>39</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>708</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>707</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/709?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Intergovernmental Management for the 21st Century, edited by Timothy J. Conlan and Paul L. Posner.]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/709?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wright, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 15 Sep 2009 07:08:24 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp013</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Intergovernmental Management for the 21st Century, edited by Timothy J. Conlan and Paul L. Posner.]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>39</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>711</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>709</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/712?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Constitutionalizing Secession in Federalized States: A Procedural Approach, by Miodrag Jovanovic. * Defunct Federalisms: Critical Perspectives on Federal Failure, edited by Emilian Kavalski and Magdalena Zolkos.]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/712?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tremblay, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 15 Sep 2009 07:08:24 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp017</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Constitutionalizing Secession in Federalized States: A Procedural Approach, by Miodrag Jovanovic. * Defunct Federalisms: Critical Perspectives on Federal Failure, edited by Emilian Kavalski and Magdalena Zolkos.]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>39</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>716</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>712</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/717?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Referees for 2007-2008]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/39/4/717?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 15 Sep 2009 07:08:24 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp019</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Referees for 2007-2008]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>39</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>720</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>717</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>List of Referees</prism:section>
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