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<title>Publius: The Journal of Federalism - Advance Access</title>
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<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp034v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and Policy Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp034v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Anecdotes have emerged in the media about why state attorneys general run for higher office, but there have been no empirical examinations of why some attorney generals (AGs) run for higher office and others do not. I seek to answer two questions: first, what shapes political ambition among state AGs? Second, how do styles of policy making affect the likelihood of AGs running for higher office? I examine Rohde&rsquo;s assumption that all politicians have progressive ambition and analyze participation in multistate lawsuits as an influence on ambition. The findings indicate that AGs begin their service with varying levels of political ambition, but also that much of the media speculation is correct: AGs who are active in multistate litigation are also likely to run for higher office.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Provost, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 04:39:37 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp034</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and Policy Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp033v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Beyond National Standards: Reconciling Tension between Federalism and the Welfare State]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp033v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>There is a tension between federalism and the welfare state. A keystone of federalism is preserving diversity by allowing populations to pursue alternative pathways from a national agenda. Under the logic of social citizenship, the welfare state should provide similar access to comparable programs for all citizens. To reconcile this tension, federations are encouraged to adopt national standards. But this begs the question: Are national standards a necessary condition for sub-national policy similarity? I test this by examining the Canadian education sector in a comparative context. My central findings suggest that national standards aren&rsquo;t necessary for the achievement of sub-national policy similarity. In lieu of national involvement, contextual factors help sub-national governments defy the odds and reconcile the tension between federalism and the welfare state.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wallner, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Thu, 12 Nov 2009 07:39:04 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp033</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Beyond National Standards: Reconciling Tension between Federalism and the Welfare State]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-12</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp032v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Federal Policy for Preserving Farmland: The Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp032v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Since 1996, the Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program, administered by the Natural Resources Conservation Service of USDA, has been the federal government&rsquo;s chief policy for preventing the urban development of agricultural lands. The program helps state and local governments and nonprofit conservation organizations to fund the purchase of easements on privately owned farms and ranches, permanently preventing development. How the FRPP has dealt with a complex intergovernmental delivery network is the theme of this article. Examining the program&rsquo;s participation requirements and funding patterns, we find that the FRPP operates differently from other federal assistance programs. In its short history, it has pursued an intergovernmental strategy of accommodating state and local interests while vigorously retaining core agency values and centralized control.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sokolow, A. D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 04 Nov 2009 06:22:49 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp032</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Federal Policy for Preserving Farmland: The Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-04</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp031v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Comparing Privacy Regimes: Federal Theory and the Politics of Privacy Regulation in the European Union and the United States]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp031v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article draws on federal theory to analyze the dynamics of crafting a privacy regime in the European Union and the United States. Three dimensions of the policy domain are analyzed: how policy was framed, the policy dynamics activated, and the policy instruments used. The main finding is that despite obvious differences in the choice of specific policy instruments, a strikingly similar regulatory dynamic and framing of policy can be detected. Two conclusions are drawn: first, federal theory can reveal novel insights on the politics of regulating privacy, especially in relation to new technologies and counter terrorism measures. Second, applying a comparative research design to EU policy-making can help explain many of its apparent empirical puzzles.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mendez, F., Mendez, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 07:33:18 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp031</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Comparing Privacy Regimes: Federal Theory and the Politics of Privacy Regulation in the European Union and the United States]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-10-30</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp030v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Federalism and Fiscal Policy: The Politics of Equalization in Canada]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp030v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Fiscal equalization is a key political issue in many federal countries, including Canada. Yet, relatively few scholars have paid systematic attention to the political dimensions of Canada&rsquo;s federal equalization program. Taking an historical and institutionalist perspective, this article explores the politics of equalization policy in Canada, with a focus on the mid-2000s, a period when equalization policy suddenly became a major source of intergovernmental conflict. The main objective of the article is to explain why and how such political struggles over equalization developed. The explanation focuses on four factors: (i) the importance of executive discretion over the equalization program; (ii) the "inter-state" nature of Canadian federalism; (iii) the concentration of non-renewable natural resources in certain provinces; and (iv) the perceptions that surround the program.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lecours, A., Beland, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 07:33:17 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp030</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Federalism and Fiscal Policy: The Politics of Equalization in Canada]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-10-30</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp029v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Hannah Arendt's Case for Federalism]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp029v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Hannah Arendt developed an acute defense of Republican Federalism as an alternative to the prevailing model of state sovereignty. However, the literature on the history of federalist ideas has long neglected her contributions, despite her continuing reputation as one of post-World War II&rsquo;s premier political theorists. One reason for this neglect is that her contributions are scattered across a broad array of different works. This article seeks to encourage a redress of this neglect by providing a guide to her critique of sovereignty and her arguments for the federal principle. Arendt&rsquo;s approach poses a fundamental challenge to the realist dismissal of world federalism as an exemplar of the naive utopianism they attributed to their idealist opponents.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Klusmeyer, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 07:33:16 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp029</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Hannah Arendt's Case for Federalism]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-10-30</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp025v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[EU Federalism and the Governance of Financial Reporting]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp025v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The European Union (EU) is built on the federalist principle of subsidiarity, which we consider in the policy field of financial reporting. We attempt to answer the question, whether the current accounting regulation in Europe is sensibly balanced between centralized and decentralized decision making. Drawing on comparative accounting research to identify criteria for "local preferences," we conclude that local solutions currently remain preferable for small and medium-sized companies. For them, a centralized solution would result in additional costs for at least some member states and their residents. Large international firms, in contrast, face an increasingly integrated capital market and rather need a central solution as currently implemented by the EU. However, recent developments in corporate finance may align local preferences on accountancy in the future.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zimmermann, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 07:33:15 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp025</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[EU Federalism and the Governance of Financial Reporting]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-10-30</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp024v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Preconditions for Foreign Activities of European Regions: Tracing Causal Configurations of Economic, Cultural, and Political Strategies]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp024v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article traces international activities of regional governments in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. We describe how intensively the regions are investing in economic, cultural, and political activities, and how broad the different activities are spread. Then we analyze preconditions for strong activities by using the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. Two assumptions about causal configurations are confirmed. First, high economic interdependencies in combination with large financial capacities are in most cases sufficient for setting up many promotional offices abroad. Second, a high level of policy autonomy, in combination with strong competencies in foreign affairs, is almost always sufficient for having a well-staffed office in Brussels. In contrast, partnerships with foreign political entities are not a result of a cultural causal configuration.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Blatter, J., Kreutzer, M., Rentl, M., Thiele, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 28 Oct 2009 05:00:20 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp024</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Preconditions for Foreign Activities of European Regions: Tracing Causal Configurations of Economic, Cultural, and Political Strategies]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-10-28</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp027v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[On the Merits of Decentralization in Young Democracies]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp027v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Three features of decentralization proposed by institutional development theory are analyzed for Mozambique&rsquo;s Autarquias, politically autonomous municipalities since 1997. The three issues analyzed in this article are: Consolidation of the fiscal state, democracy, and the development of service quality in the local administration. Under decentralization, each of the three features is shown empirically to allow progress toward political development. Using QCA-analysis, the politics contributing to institutional consolidation are identified. While the different socio-economic contexts of the Autarquias and power sharing play an important role, the effects of direct participation are more ambiguous. Decentralization can contribute to a "state closer to the people" and may correct the deficiencies of "top down" politics characterizing many African States. However, decentralization cannot overcome deep socio-political divides such as those existing in Mozambique within such a short time. Finally, positive development towards consolidation of democracy, of the local state and its service quality depend on different patterns of politics, more complex than general theories propose.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Linder, W.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 09:25:38 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp027</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[On the Merits of Decentralization in Young Democracies]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-10-22</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp028v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Rethinking Overlap and Duplication: Federalism and Environmental Assessment in Australia]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp028v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Critics of federalism have long pointed to overlap and duplication as evidence of a system under pressure. This article challenges their critique through an examination of Australia&rsquo;s environmental assessment and approval regime. It finds that, in their quest to eliminate duplication and overlap, policy makers have imposed artificial divisions on a complex policy domain. By limiting the opportunities for political engagement, they have also surrendered some of the strengths of a federal system of government and removed important failsafe mechanisms which provide valuable insurance against policy failure. While the empirical argument is based on the Australian experience, the analysis has more general implications for federations characterized by concurrency.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hollander, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 21 Oct 2009 22:59:17 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp028</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Rethinking Overlap and Duplication: Federalism and Environmental Assessment in Australia]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-10-21</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp023v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Incrementing Toward Nowhere: Universal Health Care Coverage in the States]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp023v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Despite successful adoption of other health care reforms, the states collectively have been no more successful than the federal government in achieving universal coverage. Do the same forces stopping reform at the national level also restrict states? Are the incremental steps that states have taken toward coverage likely to lead to real reform? Analysis of state activity from 1988 to 2002 shows that where Democrats are in charge and where their allied interests predominate, state legislative activity on universal care is more likely. Diffusion results indicate that what was at first a policy bandwagon effect turned into a negative diffusion effect or brake on efforts to expand coverage. We are pessimistic about the long-term success of incremental efforts and instead outline the requirements for a punctuated approach.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gray, V., Lowery, D., Monogan, J., Godwin, E. K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 20 Oct 2009 07:52:22 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp023</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Incrementing Toward Nowhere: Universal Health Care Coverage in the States]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-10-20</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp026v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Institutional Resilience Meets Critical Junctures: (re)allocation of Power in Three British Parties Post-devolution]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp026v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>How do parties react when their institutional environment is federalized or devolved? This article investigates how the three dominant British parties have responded to devolution in terms of internal reallocation of power. Party change is evaluated in the light of a functionalist and an institutionalist perspective. We find that Labour has moved incrementally away from centralism; the Conservative Party has changed more extensively towards stratarchy, while the Liberal Democrats, already federalized pre-devolution, have been the least affected of the parties. Our findings lend some support to the institutionalist thesis that (functionally driven) party change is restrained by distinct organizational legacies. However, critical junctures, typically induced by electoral failure, could facilitate a party&rsquo;s break with organizational legacies to embark on more extensive reform.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bratberg, O.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Thu, 01 Oct 2009 05:02:42 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp026</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Institutional Resilience Meets Critical Junctures: (re)allocation of Power in Three British Parties Post-devolution]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp021v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Majority Rule versus Consensus: The Political Thought of John C. Calhoun, by James H. Read.]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp021v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kincaid, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 25 Aug 2009 07:02:33 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp021</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Majority Rule versus Consensus: The Political Thought of John C. Calhoun, by James H. Read.]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-08-25</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Book Review</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp022v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their Interests in National Policymaking, by John D. Nugent.]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp022v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gormley, W.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 24 Aug 2009 04:30:17 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp022</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their Interests in National Policymaking, by John D. Nugent.]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-08-24</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Book Review</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp016v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Shari'ah in Northern Nigeria in the Light of Asymmetrical Federalism]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp016v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>In the debate that ensued after the extension of Shari&rsquo;ah to the penal codes in northern Nigeria, there emerged, among other things, the thesis that the extension of Shari&rsquo;ah can be accommodated under asymmetrical federalism. Many analysts have accepted this thesis uncritically. The main thrust of this article is to explore the main dimensions of the theory of asymmetrical federalism and find out whether the extension of Shari&rsquo;ah to the penal codes in northern Nigeria can be accommodated under the theory of asymmetrical federalism. The article argues that the extension of Shari&rsquo;ah to the penal codes in northern Nigeria represents an unusual form of asymmetrical federalism.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bolaji, M. H. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Thu, 04 Jun 2009 09:57:53 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp016</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Shari'ah in Northern Nigeria in the Light of Asymmetrical Federalism]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-06-04</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp006v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Toward Federalizing Education Policy?]]></title>
<link>http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/pjp006v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wong, K. K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 07 Apr 2009 23:53:33 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/publius/pjp006</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Toward Federalizing Education Policy?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CSF Associates Inc.</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-04-07</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Review Essay</prism:section>
</item>

</rdf:RDF>