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Publius: The Journal of Federalism Advance Access originally published online on January 6, 2009
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 2009 39(2):314-340; doi:10.1093/publius/pjn036
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of CSF Associates: Publius, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.

This article appears in the following Publius: The Journal of Federalism issue: Federalism and Constitutional Change [View the issue table of contents]

Constitutional Change in Switzerland

Dietmar Braun*
*Universite de Lausanne, Switzerland; Dietmar.Braun{at}unil.ch

The article presents a case of successful constitutional change in Switzerland, the "re-assignment of responsibilities between the federal government and the cantons and the new fiscal equalization scheme," which was adopted in 2004 by referendum. By starting from the general assumption that ways and means are needed to strengthen general interests at the expense of distributive interests in constitutional discussions, the article endeavors to identify favorable conditions for successful constitutional change. By using insights from "constitutional political economy" and "actor-centered institutionalism," four such conditions are revealed: the procedural separation of problem solving and bargaining interaction modes; the importance of ideational factors like "frames," "causal theories," and focal points; active agenda-crafting; and the structuring of constitutional debates by earlier decisions. In addition, this article highlights that other conditions, more directly linked to interest and interest struggle, can help to mitigate the intensity of distributive conflicts and are therefore indirectly conducive to a problem-solving interaction orientation of actors.


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